The European Social Model and eastern enlargement by Buttler, Friedrich et al.
The European Social Model and eastern
enlargement
Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei*
The European Social Model (ESM) is increasingly becoming a model of integration
policy. The idea is based on a combination of economic efficiency, in the sense of high
productivity, competition and economic growth, and a high level of employment on
the one hand together with social cohesion on the other hand. At the same time the
ESM is understood as a dynamic model in evolution, whose development is influenced
by global, European and national processes, including eastern enlargement. With the
accession of the eight Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union,
the economic and social disparities between the now 25 EU Member States have grown
considerably. On the basis of theoretical and empirical literature this paper develops
answers to the following questions in particular: will there be a gradual erosion of the
ESM, are there prospects of convergence or are new vectors developing in the enlarged
field of power? The authors reach the conclusion that the old and the new Member
States, starting out from different historical experiences in the past decades and differ-
ent levels of production and productivity, will have to withstand structurally similar
challenges in the foreseeable future if they wish to achieve economic efficiency and
social cohesion simultaneously. From the perspective of the new Member States, which
come from an egalitarian tradition, there is every reason to believe that the majority
of the population desires social cohesion and will demand it. Together with the diverse
integration advantages of enlargement, a successful catching-up process in the new
Member States provides good preconditions for the preservation and productive devel-
opment of the ESM.
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1 Introduction
The existence of a ‘European Social Model’ (ESM)
seems to be far less controversial in the meantime
than its exact description. The term was used by Jac-
ques Delors in the mid-1990s to set a European al-
ternative against the US American market capital-
ism. The original idea was to combine economic
growth with social progress and social cohesion. In
the meantime the term is used in very different con-
texts and the concept behind the term is frequently
defined differently. According to Hay/Watson/Win-
cott (1999) and Jepsen/Pascual (2004) it is possible
to distinguish different definition categories or “ref-
erence dimensions” (Platzer 2003) in more recent
literature. Most frequently reference is made to cer-
tain common characteristics and features (funda-
mental values, principles, institutions) that have
developed in western European countries since
the second world war in contrast to large parts of
the “Anglo-Saxon” world (cf. Ferrera/Hemerijck/
Rhodes 2001 and Servais 2001). In view of the diver-
sity of nation-state social systems in Europe, how-
ever, this approach, which refers to fundamental val-
ues, remains rather abstract and difficult to analyse.
Elsewhere, typologies of national social models are
offered, some of which are emphasised as being par-
ticularly pioneering (cf. Esping-Anderson 1990 and
1998, Ebbinghaus1999 and Hicks and Kenworthy
2003).
Since the end of the 1990s the ESM has been in-
creasingly regarded as an official EU project and a
model of integration policy (Platzer 2003). In this
connection the common normative basis is com-
bined with the different political-institutional condi-
tions at national and European level (Vaughan-
Whitehead 2003), whereby great significance is at-
tached to the common employment and social pol-
icy. “The EU adds value by setting minimum social
standards at the workplace and beyond, and by pro-
viding political and technical ‘back-up’ for national
efforts to reform work and welfare.” (Diamanto-
poulou 2003). The European Council describes the
ESM as an important instrument of renewal and ad-
justment to changing socio-economic conditions, in
which high productivity, competition and economic
growth as well as a high level of employment are
regarded as the necessary basis. It is therefore an
integrated economic and social model.
At the same time the ESM is understood as a dy-
namic model in evolution, whose development is in-
fluenced by global, European and national forces
and processes (cf. Jepsen/Pascual 2004). Three de-
velopments are repeatedly emphasised in this con-
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text. Firstly, the response of the ESM to changes in
socio-economic conditions such as the changing in-
ternational production systems, the ageing of the
population, high levels of unemployment and chang-
ing family structures (Esping-Andersen 2002). Sec-
ondly, the implications of the European monetary
union and the associated Stability and Growth Pact
for the leeway in shaping national social policy; and
thirdly, the aspect which is of particular interest
here: the impact of eastern enlargement on the Eu-
ropean Social Model.
With the accession of the eight Central and Eastern
European countries to the European Union, the
economic and social disparities between the now 25
EU Member states have grown considerably. The
greater variance of incomes and living standards in
the expanded community is observed with scepti-
cism by many. It is feared that lower wage costs and
social standards lead to unfair competition or social
dumping (“race to the bottom” and social-policy
“freeriding”) and put the labour markets and the
social policy of the old Member states under consid-
erable pressure to adjust. At the same time, accord-
ing to the impression of some observers (cf. e.g.
Vaughan-Whitehead 2003), in the course of liberal
reforms, institutional welfare state structures have
developed in the new Member states which show
considerable differences from those of the EU15. As
a result, orchestrated policy that is aimed at cohe-
sion in the Europe of 25 may well become consider-
ably more complex.
If that is the case, the question arises as to whether
and to what extent the eastern enlargement of the
EU can affect the development of the ESM. Will
there be a successive erosion of the model, are there
prospects of convergence or are new vectors devel-
oping in the enlarged field of power? What central
demands does enlargement make on the political
management of the Community?
On the basis of theoretical and empirical literature,
this paper attempts to provide answers to those
questions.
In the following chapter the origin, the concept and
the stage of development of the European Social
Model is first explained. In connection with this, the
chapter deals in particular with the diversity in the
unity of the European social systems and the funda-
mental differences from other social systems, espe-
cially from the Anglo-American model.
Chapter 3 examines the economic and social catch-
ing-up process of the new Central and Eastern Eu-
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the new members have converged with the EU, in
which areas there are larger differences and where
they are developing their own solutions which ex-
tend the spectrum of the Community.
The concluding chapter analyses the stress factors
to which the ESM finds itself exposed even without
eastern enlargement. Then with regard to liberal re-
forms in the new Member states, potential repercus-
sions of eastern enlargement on the European So-
cial Model are discussed and development perspec-
tives are offered.
2 The European Social Model: diver-
sity in unity
2.1 On the development of the ESM
Where are the roots of the European Social Model,
how has it developed and how is it best described
today?
The ESM was not yet drawn up in the 1957 Treaties
of Rome; at that time growth policy was considered
the best social policy. That remains true until today
in as far as the priorities of business development
and profitable employment are addressed. The em-
ployment of the largest possible share of the labour
force limits the resources to be raised for avoiding
social risks and at the same time facilitates the fund-
ing of the social policy systems. This forms a bridge
spanning from Rome to the Lisbon Strategy for
2010.
The ESM was not first of all the result of common
European policy but of the parallel development, al-
beit plural and staggered in time, of the national so-
cial systems in western, northern and southern Eu-
rope in the second half of the 20th century. Signifi-
cantly, common social policy first dealt with subjects
that promoted additional social-policy measures
concerning one of the four great freedoms of the
common market, cross-border labour mobility (cf.
for example the EEC regulation No. 1408/71 con-
cerning the administrative and technical facilitation
of the free movement of persons covered by social
security). The more comprehensive idea of an “es-
pace social europe ´en”, which followed tentative at-
tempts at common social policy, was propagated
with some success from the 1980s onwards by the
then president of the European Commission, Jac-
ques Delors. Nonetheless the principle of subsidiar-
ity has remained decisive until today for the ratio of
national and European social policies.
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Thus it was essentially only in later treaties (on the
establishment of the European Union in Maastricht
in 1992), in Amsterdam in 1997 and Nice in 2001, in
resolutions passed by the European Council, by the
European Parliament and the Commission that the
elements of the ESM which are the result of Com-
munity policy were gradually developed and imple-
mented at national and European level (see 2.2.3).
Basic social rights are proclaimed in declarations Ð
from the European Social Charter of the European
Council in 1961 to the European Charter of Basic
Social Rights of the EU in 2000 Ð and are thus an
essential part of the common core of values.
In the conclusions of the presidency of the Nice Eu-
ropean Council in 2000 there is something like a first
official definition: “the European Social Model,
characterized in particular by systems that offer a
high level of social protection, by the importance of
social dialogue and by services of general interest
covering activities vital for social cohesion, is today
based, beyond the diversity of the Member states’
social systems, on a common core of values”. The
unitas is therefore described by common values, the
diversitas in unitate by the national social systems.
The Barcelona European Council in 2002 empha-
sised economic development and employment as be-
ing fundamental to the development and the scope
of social policy: “The European Social Model is
based on good economic performance, a high level
of social protection and education and social dia-
logue.”
The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Eu-
rope, which was adopted by the European Council
of the Heads of State and Government of the 25
EU Member states in Brussels in 2004, emphasises
equality and solidarity as fundamental values in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Part II) and, in the
third chapter of Part III, comments on the co-ordi-
nated employment strategy and on social policy. Ar-
ticle III-103 names as objectives “the promotion of
employment, improved living and working condi-
tions, so as to make possible their harmonisation
while the improvement is being maintained, proper
social protection, dialogue between management
and labour, the development of human resources
with a view to lasting high employment and the
combating of exclusion” (The Constitution Ð edited
by Jens-Peter Bonde, 19.05.2004, p. 110f.). Thus far
the first document passed jointly after enlargement.
Partly because the ESM has changed in the course
of time and in the process has been and is still being
exposed to diverse and in some cases controversial
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definition, as we mentioned in the introduction.
Their historical dependence on processes is reflected
upon quite accurately by Vaughan-Whitehead (2003,
p. 4): “We could define the ESM as a set of Euro-
pean Community and member-state legal regula-
tions, but also as a range of practices aimed at pro-
moting a voluntaristic and comprehensive social pol-
icy in the European Union. Beyond this, for EU pol-
icy makers and a wide range of economic and social
actors, the European Social Model also represents
sharing common views and principles on different
social issues and their importance within the EC
construction”.
In summary it is therefore possible today to set out
three characteristic elements or levels of the ESM,
which are not selective and are mutually dependent:
1. A common normative basis: what is meant here is
first and foremost the declaration of belief in the
core values of solidarity, social justice, social re-
sponsibility and social cohesion, which is shared
by all continental European welfare states. Social
cohesion, and thus the principle of social balance
and social inclusion, is especially distinct in this
connection and can sometimes be attributed to
the Europeans’ particular ideas regarding justice
and freedom.1
2. The conviction that the social dimension de-
scribed by the core values has a positive effect
on economic development and long-term political
stability. Social policy is therefore regarded as a
productive factor which can promote economic
growth, competitiveness and social welfare
equally.
3. The political-institutional developments at na-
tional and European level.
In the second half of the 20th century, different wel-
fare-state structures were developed in the countries
of Europe on the basis of the named values and
principles. Although clear differences can be seen
between the individual countries or groups of coun-
tries as regards the development of welfare-state in-
stitutions, it is also possible to determine important
common factors. What is especially characteristic in
this connection is the high level of social protection
1 „For Americans, freedom has long been associated with auto-
nomy.... One is free by becoming self-reliant and an island unto
oneself. With wealth comes exclusivity, and with exclusivity comes
security... For Europeans freedom is not found in autonomy but
in community. Being free means having access to many indepen-
dent relationships... Here security comes from inclusivity Ð be-
longing, not belongings“. (Rifkin, 2004)
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against life risks for the entire population and a dis-
tinct tradition of social dialogue and social partner-
ship. In addition to this, in the meantime the Euro-
pean Union has a growing number of political in-
struments with which the named fundamental social
values and social convictions are propagated and
supported and attempts made to implement them
also at Community level.
However, especially the last of these three levels
raises several questions simultaneously: What does
the variance of the institutional form of national
welfare states look like today? Can there still be any
unity in this diversity? How can the growing vari-
ance of welfare-state structures be meaningfully dis-
tinguished from other models and concepts and
what role is played in this by the community pillar
of the ESM that has now been added?
2.2 Unity yet diversity?
2.2.1 Differences between the EU mem-
ber states
A broad spectrum of different social systems can be
found in today’s European Community. A brief
glance at the per capita expenditure on social pro-
tection is enough to show considerable disparities
between the Member states. Measured in terms of
purchasing power parities, the greatest deviations
from the mean of the EU15 = 100 in 2001 were pro-
vided by Luxembourg with 165 and Portugal with 57
(Table 1). Even if these countries’ different levels of
affluence (measured in terms of per capita GDP)
are taken into consideration, clear divergences can
still be ascertained.
In the literature one can occasionally find attempts
to differentiate between groups of countries repre-
senting different variants of the ESM, such as the
Scandinavian countries, the southern European
countries, continental central European countries
representing different variants of the ESM, Anglo-
Saxon countries and the Mediterranean variant (cf.
Esping-Andersen, 1990, Castles and Mitchell 1993).
This can only be partially understood from the ag-
gregate data of Table 1, and would require a more
in-depth comparison of systems in order to obtain
confirmation or refutation. This can be explained by
taking Great Britain as an example. The social ex-
penditure does not differ considerably from the
EU15 average, but the social-policy conception does
differ: the British conception gives individual re-
sponsibility regarding risks an important status, it
avoids the term solidarity principle and where nec-Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei The European Social Model and eastern enlargement
essary speaks of cross-subsidisation, and it empha-
sises less the social-security entitlement in the sense
of the insurance principle and more the assistance
for particular target groups. In this respect it is right
to speak of an Anglo-American model.
The structure of social benefits by function groups
shows, with the exception of Ireland, that the ex-
penditure on provision for old age is the top func-
tion, followed by expenditure on health (cf. Table 1).
But here, too, the variance is considerable and the
different priorities of the Member states become
clear. Partly these priorities largely follow the com-
mon requirements of the ageing population, see for
example the relatively small share of old-age provi-
sion in Ireland, with its young age structure; partly
they follow different preferences, e.g. in family pol-
icy, and partly different strategies to deal with simi-
lar problems such as in the context of labour market
policy, where, comparing Spain with Italy or Great
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Britain, unemployment rates and expenditure on
the unemployed do not correlate at all (European
Social Statistics, Social Protection, Expenditure and
Receipts. Data 1992Ð2001, Eurostat 2004, p. 53).
The diversity of the social systems in the old EU
Member states is therefore clear. In order to deter-
mine whether a common concept nonetheless un-
derlies all of them it is necessary to look into the
question (ex negativo) as to fundamental differences
from other social systems.
2.2.2 Fundamental differences from other
social systems
There are several different study methods available
for differentiating from other social models or sys-
tems. Firstly it is possible once again to compare in-
vestments in social areas with objectives, in orderThe European Social Model and eastern enlargement Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei
to underline different content-related priorities and
preferences and to distinguish them from one an-
other (input side). Secondly it is possible to exam-
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ine, with the aid of selected social indicators, to what
extent the same priorities and objectives are also ac-
tually implemented or achieved (output side).Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei The European Social Model and eastern enlargement
If the public expenditure rates and the expenditure
structure as percentages of the gross domestic prod-
uct are compared (Table 2), then the difference be-
tween the public expenditure rate of the EU15 and
that of the USA (48.4 and 35,3 respectively) is ex-
plained almost entirely by the difference in the so-
cial expenditure rates (27.5 and 14.3 respectively).
A look at the expenditure on health and education
in the USA shows that the differences in the public
expenditure rates do not necessarily indicate a lower
preference for the corresponding goods and ser-
vices, but point more to differences in their private
and public provision and funding. This is also associ-
ated with different organisation principles. Market-
like provision and contribution funding in line with
social security law do not work without complete
or partial equivalence; tax funding can place more
emphasis on solidarity and the ability-to-pay princi-
ple. What is behind this are different ideas of justice
and different concepts of social protection or indi-
vidual provision against risk: compared with conti-
nental European ideas, US American ideas cur-
rently emphasise more individual provision than sol-
idarity-related balancing of risks (a look back at the
time of the New Deal shows that this was not always
the case). Taking into consideration the principle of
need, social welfare is aimed in particular at socially
weak target groups, for which it holds ready a safety
net (targeted social assistance), which is admittedly
not based on entitlements according to social secu-
rity law. High-income groups are expected to cover
themselves against possible risks on the market or
in the family. As a result the US American model
permits far greater income disparities than what is
considered desirable according to present European
standards. The difference can be found in the norm-
ative assumptions about distinguishing between the
tasks of social policy and those of the family and the
market (Esping-Andersen 1998), in the interpreta-
tion of the term equality, equality of starting chances
vs. similarity of working and living conditions and
thus in the strategies for social cohesion, social bal-
ance and social inclusion.
This connection is also confirmed by output analy-
ses. In a corresponding study, Witte (2004) refers to
three relevant social indicators that provide infor-
mation about the extent of social cohesion in Euro-
pean and Anglo-Saxon countries. These indicators
are the income disparities mentioned earlier (Gini
coefficient), the number of violent crimes and the
number of people in prison. He compares these indi-
cators with other social indicators in the areas of the
satisfaction of material needs (incl. GDP per capita
and life expectation) and social participation (incl.
reading competence and election turn-out). The
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comparison shows that the Anglo-Saxon countries
only diverge clearly from the general picture of the
particular group of countries examined (in relation
to the other two indicators) with regard to social
cohesion.
The results therefore largely confirm the assumption
that a European Social Model does exist, whereby
the essential difference from the Anglo-Saxon in-
dustrial countries including Great Britain is in the
pursuit and practical implementation of the objec-
tive of social cohesion.
2.2.3 The community pillar of the ESM:
instruments of community policy
developed so far
The Community-institutional side of the ESM has
developed in progressive steps especially in the last
15Ð20 years. In the meantime the EU has at its dis-
posal several forms of social-policy instruments: leg-
islation, the social dialogue, financial instruments
(structural funds), the open method of co-ordination
and “mainstreaming”:
(1) The common legislation, which has so far found
expression in some 70 directives and other acts
of legislation on the subjects of the mobility of
labour, regulations at work, equal rights for men
and women, and health and safety at the work-
place. The results of the common legislation
form the acquis communautaire, which is a set of
minimum standards that new Member states
have to adopt entirely in the context of prepara-
tion for accession.
(2) The European Structural Funds Ð first and fore-
most the European Social Fund (ESF) and the
PROGRESS programme, which are aimed at
breaking down differences in the living and
working conditions in the Member states.
During the period 2000Ð2006 the old Member
states receive EUR 213 billion from the Struc-
tural Funds including the Cohesion Fund. In the
period 2004Ð2006 at total of EUR 24.5 billion
will be made available to the new Member states
from the Structural Funds, including EUR 3.3
billion for the ESF (European Commission 2004,
Structural Funds Strategies for the new Member
states).
(3) The open method of co-ordination was devel-
oped in the context of common employment pol-
icy and has been applied to subjects of social pol-
icy too since the Lisbon European Council. It is
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national action plans for implementation, and a
common system of indicators and observation
for evaluation. Open co-ordination makes it pos-
sible to determine strategic objectives with re-
gard to social inclusion, permits a variety of op-
tions for achieving the objectives and backs in-
creasing coherence through mutual learning.
There is a broad range of literature on what it
can and can not achieve (cf. Scharpf 2002 for a
summary).
(4) The Treaty of Amsterdam (Art. 138) opened up
to the social partners rights of initiative and
other possibilities of participation in the field of
employment and social affairs. The fundamental
idea of the social dialogue, which mutatis mutan-
dis corresponds to the corporatist tripartite or-
ganisation of a variety of social protection insti-
tutions in the Member states and in the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation plus their extension
by other elements of civil society, is the supple-
menting of parliamentary democracy by partici-
patory elements on condition that the partici-
pants themselves satisfy the criteria of represent-
ativeness and internal democratic order. Social
dialogue intends to make systematic use of spe-
cialist competence and consideration of the part-
ners’ interests. The balance of interests and the
building up of trust act in combination and con-
tribute to the reduction of transaction costs Ð
even when taking into account the transaction
costs of reaching agreement itself. This is typi-
cally the case with collective bargaining agree-
ments.
Key subjects of common policy in the context of the
ESM so far are (this lists makes no claim to be ex-
haustive): employees’ rights, worker participation,
employment and its quality, equal opportunities, so-
cial dialogue and collective negotiations, services of
general interest, the non-discrimination principle,
regional cohesion, social inclusion, fair wages, par-
ticipation of the social partners and the civil society,
fundamental social rights, cross-border social pro-
tection and transnational social policy (cf. Vaughan-
Whitehead 2003, p. 6).
As the above list shows, Community policy in the
context of the ESM is factually restricted so far. A
look at the function groups of social protection,
which are extensive in financial terms in the Mem-
ber states, in other words old-age and survivors’
pensions, health care, family and children, disabili-
ties and unemployment (cf. Table 1), makes clear
the magnitude of the areas that are essentially or-
ganised on a national basis. Community social pol-
icy, however, seeks further possibilities for develop-
104 ZAF 1/2006
ment on the way to open co-ordination and provides
support through social dialogue wherever the devel-
opment of the Single European Market compels
countries to break up gradually the principle of so-
cial-law territoriality, and suggests joint solutions
with the aid of one of the four instruments or new
ones.
Social policy essentially remains a national task, but
understanding where additional Community action
is necessary and what form this action should take is
subject to change. Subsidiarity is not a static concept
(Terwey 2004). Social policy in the EU is gaining
new dynamics due to eastern enlargement, which
has resulted in an increase in economic and social
disparities between and within the Member states.
3 Eastern enlargement: the eco-
nomic catching-up process and
changes in welfare-state institu-
tions
3.1 Economy and labour market in the
new member states
The enlargement of 1 May 2004 presents a large new
economic and social challenge to the European Un-
ion. Countries have joined that still lag far behind
the EU15 in economic terms. This means that eco-
nomic and social differentials will continue to exist
within the EU25 for a long time.
The success of the advancing European integration
can initially be measured by how the necessary
catching-up process gets off the ground and then
gathers momentum. Thus, in a first step, the accom-
plishments already made are appraised and develop-
ment trends are outlined on the basis of meaning-
ful Ð internationally comparable Ð indicators for
the performance of the economy and employment.
An appropriate social-policy framework is inextrica-
bly linked with the new Member states’ catching-up
process. In this respect, it has to be determined
which welfare-state structures are developing within
the new EU Member states, and whether their insti-
tutional structures already show any similarities to
the EU15.
The ten new Member states are characterized by de-
velopment levels that lag significantly behind the
EU15. Thus, the gross domestic product per capita
of the new Member states, measured in terms of
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of the EU15 average. In addition, there are consid-
erable economic differences between the new Mem-
ber states. In the following the disparities between
the new Member states and in particular the gap
between the new States and the EU15 are outlined
on the basis of key economic and labour market in-
dicators. The examination focuses on the period
from 1995 to 2003. The year 1995 marks a turning
point with regard to the economy. Following the se-
vere adjustment crisis at the beginning of the 1990s
with a massive decline in gross domestic product in
some cases, the Central and Eastern European
economies consolidated at a low level in the mid-
1990s, and a more or less strong upward develop-
ment started. The catching-up process in the econ-
omy and the labour market that has continued since
then is first to be examined empirically. In addition,
development trends are outlined.
3.1.1 Status of the catching-up process
and its prospects
The economic situation of the new EU Member
states still differs considerably from that of the
EU15. The first column of Table 3 shows that when
measured in terms of purchasing power parities,
none of the new Member states reached the average
gross domestic product of the EU15 in 2003. How-
ever, two countries, the Mediterranean state of Cy-
prus and South-eastern European Slovenia, sur-
passed the economic level of the least developed
state of the former EU15, namely Portugal. While
Malta, the second new Mediterranean EU Member
State, showed only a slightly lower gross domestic
product per capita than Portugal, what stands out in
the case of the remaining seven Central and Eastern
European states is that there is a considerable differ-
ence between the Baltic States and Poland and west-
ern Europe.
With regard to the development of the gross domes-
tic product in real terms, the second column of Table
3 shows that especially the new Central and Eastern
European Member states have finally begun a more
or less rapid catching-up process Ð after the signifi-
cant decline in their economic activities at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, which was caused by transforma-
tion. In the period between 1995, a year which was
already marked by a strong economic rebound fol-
lowing the political change in the Central and East-
ern European countries, and 2003 the economies
grew more strongly than those in the western part
of the Union, with the exception of the Czech Re-
public. The highest growth rates were achieved by
the Baltic States, precisely those countries with the
lowest per capita income.
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According to available estimates, in the next 10
years the new Member states will participate consid-
erably more strongly than the EU15 in the growth
effects of the intensified division of labour in Eu-
rope, which has been furthered by integration (Eu-
ropean Commission 2001; Breuss 2001). Estimates
assume that in the next decade the gross domestic
product in the new Member states will increase by
between 8% and 18% more than would have been
possible without their accession to the Union. Based
on these model calculations, the integration effect
for the previous EU15 would be significantly lower,
at 1% to 2% for the following decade.
The EU Commission’s forecasts until 2005 indicate
that the catching-up process of the new Member
states could continue in a similar way (Eurostat
2004). In the next two years economic growth in the
Baltic States is expected to be twice as high as in the
previous EU15. However, the positive expectations
should not obscure the fact that there are considera-
ble risks for the catching-up process and that the
adjustment could take an extremely long time. On
the one hand, the risks for the catching-up process
lie in managing the structural change, which is
highly necessary, especially the long overdue mod-
ernisation of industry, the development of an effi-
cient services sector as well as the restructuring of
agriculture, which is still by far too labour-intensive.The European Social Model and eastern enlargement Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei
In addition, in some countries there are obvious ma-
croeconomic problems that have to be countered by
economic policy sooner or later (cf. Borbely/Gern
2003; Brügelmann/Fuest 2004). Thus, Hungary, Slo-
venia and Slovakia still show inflation rates of 4%
and more, not least because of the economic trans-
formation. Another problem is the sometimes con-
siderable level of national debt. In Poland, Slovakia,
the Czech Republic and Hungary the state financing
deficit clearly exceeds 3% of the gross domestic
product. Solving these macroeconomic problems
might lead to contractive effects and may slow down
the catching-up process, at least in the short term.
Even when being optimistic and assuming that the
mentioned macroeconomic risks will be dealt with
successfully and that the countermeasures will not
result in lasting frictions, it will be a very long time
before it will be possible to speak of an equality of
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living conditions in the enlarged European Union.
However, it should pointed out here that significant
welfare differentials continue to exist even among
the EU15. Assuming that income disparities will re-
main for some time and on a certain scale in the
EU15 as well, it is possible that the new Member
states can achieve the western European welfare
corridor in the not too distant future if their econo-
mies grow steadily and strongly. Realistically, in the
foreseeable future it will therefore be less a matter
of alignment and more of convergence of living con-
ditions in the enlarged European Union.
3.1.2 Employment and unemployment
Similar to the economic situation, there are consid-
erable differences in the employment situation in
the new states of the European Union (cf. Table 4).Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei The European Social Model and eastern enlargement
Overall, the employment rate for the average of the
new EU countries was 8.6 percentage points lower
in 2003 than that of the previous EU15. The employ-
ment rates for younger workers aged between 15
and 24 showed an extremely large difference of
more than 15 percentage points. There was also a
considerable difference of 10 percentage points as
regards the employment rates for older workers
(aged 54 to 64). In contrast, there were smaller dif-
ferences concerning the employment rates of
women, which particularly in Central and Eastern
Europe had already been high in the socialist era.
As expected, the unemployment rates are mirror
images of the employment rates. The mean value of
the new EU states is clearly above the EU15 aver-
age. Of the Central and Eastern European countries
Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic have the
lowest unemployment rates. In contrast, Slovakia
and again Poland have especially high rates.
The information on employment by economic sector
provided in Table 4 shows that manufacturing and
agriculture still play a far greater role in the new
Member states than in the EU15. This is especially
true of manufacturing in the Czech Republic and
Slovenia, and regarding agriculture in Poland and
Lithuania. Thus, the economic structure of the new
EU States shows potential for productivity increases
in the primary and secondary sectors and for the
development of business and personal services.
The new EU States also show a differentiated pic-
ture concerning the distribution of certain employ-
ment forms. Part-time work is far less common in
the new EU countries than in the EU15. This corre-
sponds to the pattern that can also be observed in
the EU15, according to which workers in less devel-
oped countries show a lower preference for this em-
ployment form, not least because of the lower in-
come associated with it. While there are less distinct
differences between the new and the old EU States
concerning fixed-term employment, the self-em-
ployment rate in the new States is usually higher
than in the western European countries. However,
if the self-employment rate is calculated without ag-
riculture a completely different picture emerges: the
average value for the new Member states (for Po-
land as well) is then below the mean of the EU15.
In summary, firms and workers in the new member
countries have demonstrated high levels of flexibil-
ity and innovative potential in the transformation
process, which nonetheless has an underside:
“Alongside this adaptation process, however, a
number of abuses have been identified, with adverse
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working conditions especially with regard to occupa-
tional health and safety, excessive recourse to self-
employment status and civil contracts, long working
time, massive unpaid overtime, under-reporting of
wages, stress at work and in life in general with diffi-
culties reconciling work and family life” (Vaughan-
Whitehead 2005, p. 42).
In contrast to economic growth, an upward trend in
the development of the labour markets in the new
EU countries is not visible despite the generally less
favourable levels compared with the EU15. On the
contrary: the average of the eight new Eastern Eu-
ropean EU countries showed a negative employ-
ment trend between 1995 and 2003 in spite of gener-
ally high GDP growth (cf. Table 5). The only excep-
tions were Slovenia and Latvia, which showed a
small growth in employment, and Hungary, whose
employment growth was the same level as the EU15
average. Similarly to the situation in the new Bun-
desländer after reunification, this development is
caused by an economic growth, which was mostly
based on productivity increases (jobless growth).
The increase in employment in growing sectors is
obviously still far less dynamic than the labour dis-
placement in shrinking sectors. It is likely, if every-
thing else remains as it is, that the employment
problems will not decrease but instead will tend to
grow in the near future despite the expected strong
growth.The European Social Model and eastern enlargement Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei
3.1.3 Demography and migration
What is of particular importance for long-term eco-
nomic and employment development as well as for
the migration potential in the enlarged Union is not
least the demographic development of the new
Member states. Birth rates, life expectancy and mi-
gration behaviour are crucial here. The population
of the new Member states is on average younger
than that of the previous EU15 (Dickmann 2004).
This can be put down to the fact that until the 1980s
the birth rates were higher than those in western
Europe. After that, in the course of the political
change in systems at the beginning of the 1990s, the
so-called “total fertility rates” declined during the
following decade to between 1.1 and 1.4, the lowest
value worldwide (EU: 1.5).2 It will not be possible
until 2020 to judge whether family plans have only
been postponed or have perhaps even been can-
celled. By then it will have become clear whether
the women of these age-groups actually have clearly
fewer children than their predecessors or whether
they just have them at a later stage in their lives.
Eastern Europe also differs from the west with re-
gard to life expectancy. Whereas in the west it has
been increasing steadily and will probably continue
to increase, it has stagnated in most of the new
Member states. These two factors together (birth
rates and life expectancy) inevitably lead to a de-
cline in the population of the new Member states
just as in western Europe, even if it comes into effect
in the new Member states a little later. The develop-
ment of the population segment aged between 15
and 64, which is important for the labour market, is
already showing a declining tendency in nearly all
of the new Member states. Poland and Slovakia will
follow this trend from 2010 and 2015 respectively
(cf. also United Nations Population Division 2003).
The labour forces of Central and Eastern Europe
have good levels of formal qualifications despite the
low productivity of labour when compared with the
EU15 (Plünnecke/Werner 2004). The proportion of
workers who have an upper secondary school quali-
fication is significantly larger than in the EU15.
However, in comparison with western Europe, the
new Member states have a smaller proportion of
workers with tertiary education such as e.g. univer-
sity, master craftsmen’s college and technical col-
2 The total fertility rate indicates the cross-section of the age-
specific birth rates of all women aged between 15 and 45. It illu-
strates the number of children a woman would have, if she con-
stantly behaved in the same way as the women at the time of
consideration.
108 ZAF 1/2006
leges (Schäfer 2004). Due to the continuing high un-
employment and the massive structural change,
however, it is to be feared that in the course of the
transformation human capital has already been de-
valuated to a considerable extent and might con-
tinue to do be devaluated.
Concerning migration movements, the new EU
Member states are confronted with two develop-
ments. Firstly, there is possible emigration to the
western parts of the European Union, and, secondly,
there is possible immigration from other Eastern
European countries.
Relevant studies estimate the maximum emigration
from the new EU Member states at a magnitude of
1 to 1.5 million people over a period of 15 years
(EIC 2000; Dustmann et al. 2003; Krieger 2004). It
has to be taken into account here however, that in
contrast to the assumptions made in the research,
the free movement of labour will have been intro-
duced only in stages by 2011, and that the effects
are more likely to be only of regional importance
(Germany, Austria and Finland). In line with the de-
velopments in the EU15, it can be assumed that the
more highly qualified will show an increased willing-
ness to be mobile. Therefore, emigration should be
less of a problem for the countries of destination
in western Europe, and more of a problem for the
countries of origin in Central and Eastern Europe.
For these countries could lose valuable human capi-
tal, which they need so desperately for a successful
catching-up process.
Table 6 shows that immigration is also a topic when
seen from the perspective of the new Member states.
Whereas at the beginning of the 1990s especially the
Baltic States showed a negative migration balance,
most of the new EU countries (exceptions: Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland) have a positive migration bal-
ance in the meantime. This can be put down to in-
creased migration from countries such as Russia,
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. Migrants from these
states use access to the new EU States as a stepping
stone to the western part of the EU.
3.2 Social-policy framework in the new
member states
The new Member states will participate especially
strongly in the growing European integration.3
3 Cf. IAB-Kurzbericht Nr. 12/2004 “Erweiterung der Europäi-
schen Union. Aufholprozess mit Chancen und Risiken”.Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei The European Social Model and eastern enlargement
However, considerable economic disparities will
continue to exist for some time in the enlarged Un-
ion. This will presumably be associated with a con-
stant social gap in the EU25. One question that
arises in particular in this respect is whether and to
what extent the present social-policy framework in
the new EU countries will prove to be a help or a
hindrance for the catching-up process that is needed
there.
Changes in welfare-state institutions are necessary
in the new Member states for various reasons. De-
spite unmistakeable economic progress, the conse-
quences of the political transformation have not yet
been overcome. In the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, a radical change of system is taking
place, which cancels out the usual path dependence
of social regimes. In addition to this the organising
of the particular welfare-state apparatus has to be
harmonised with the economic catching-up efforts
and coping with existing labour market problems.
But that is not all. In addition, when organising their
welfare-state the new Member states, just like the
old ones, have to face the trends that are also valid
for Western Europe. These include falling birth
rates, a change to a service economy, increasing de-
mands regarding qualifications in the new employ-
ment opportunities and a greater demand for inter-
nal and external flexibility of labour input.
On the basis of key elements of welfare-state sys-
tems, the following section shows what level of de-
velopment the new Member states have reached so
far and what chances and opportunities could arise
for the catching-up process as a result.
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3.2.1 Labour market legislation and
labour relations
Due to the growing employment problems in the
new EU countries, which were mentioned earlier,
the ability of their labour markets to work deserves
particular attention. In the area of individual labour
law, the new Member states have extensive arrange-
ment possibilities. In economic and political debate,
great importance is attached to employment protec-
tion in this respect. Employment protection legisla-
tion brings together the regulations on individual
dismissal protection, collective dismissals and forms
of temporary employment such as fixed-term em-
ployment and temporary work via employment
agencies. A current comparison of legislation, which
was conducted by the OECD, shows that Central
and Eastern European countries such as Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have less
strict regulations than many continental European
countries (cf. Table 7).4
The labour markets of the new Member states have
become more flexible in the course of the transfor-
mation. In the course of the structural change, la-
bour turnover Ð measured in rates of hirings and
layoffs Ð increased and the average duration of em-
ployment in a firm decreased. However, the new
4 Comparable indicators for Slovenia and the three Baltic states
are only available for the late 1990s. According to this data, em-
ployment protection legislation there, with an overall value of
2.3Ð2.7 (as a comparison: Germany 2.5), was somewhat stricter
than in the Central and Eastern European countries included in
the OECD comparison, which at the time had a range of 1.3Ð2.4.The European Social Model and eastern enlargement Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei
countries have, at least so far, shown a different pat-
tern of response to the economic situation from that
seen in western European countries: whilst the
course of labour turnover has been counter-cyclical,
the development of the duration of employment was
more pro-cyclical (cf. Cazes/Nesporova 2003). This
can probably be put down to the transformation cri-
sis, which is still continuing, since unlike in western
Europe, the still high level of employment insecurity
in the new Member states induces fewer workers to
change their jobs even during especially good times.
According to internationally comparative studies,
less stringent employment protection increases the
permeability of the labour markets in the transfor-
mation countries, too, and thus counteracts the per-
sistence of unemployment (cf. ebd.). In connection
with rather more decentralised wage-determination,
which is explained below, the new Member states
would therefore have the possibility to use the op-
tions of high labour market flexibility in order to
combat their employment problems. This requires,
however, that the workers do not experience the
necessary change as a threat but understand it to be
an opportunity. The chances of realisation and suc-
cess of such an approach would increase if high la-
bour market flexibility were accompanied by labour
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market and social policy aimed at activation (cf.
Auer and Cazes 2003).
Another important element of the changes in wel-
fare-state institutions concerns the development of
productive labour relations. Agreements on wages
and other employment-contract standards have a de-
cisive influence on the ability of the labour market to
adjust. In the Central and Eastern European coun-
triesthetransitiontolabourrelationsthatareconsist-
ent with the free market economy has not yet been
concluded (cf. Lecher 2000). Nevertheless they have
already forged quite a long way ahead in this respect.
Trade unions and firms are allowed to organise and
reach agreements (cf. Funk/Lesch 2004). Union den-
sity in the new Member states is approximately as
high as the average of the previous EU15. Neverthe-
less there are differences: countries such as Hungary,
Slovenia and Slovakia show higher union density,
whereas fewer workers are members of a trade union
in Poland (cf. Cazes/Nesporova 2003; Funk/Lesch
2004). It must be pointedout, however, that the trade
union movement is demonstrating fragmentation
tendencies in some of these countries. As a result the
latter aspect means that the ability of the social part-
ners to negotiate can be impaired from time to time.Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei The European Social Model and eastern enlargement
Whereas the proportion of firms bound by collective
agreements is comparatively large in the new Mem-
ber states, with over 50% almost throughout, the
degree of centralisation of the wage negotiations on
the other hand is decreasing steadily (cf. Cazes/Ne-
sporova 2003). There are several reasons for the
more decentralised form of wage agreements. Thus
a collective labour law of western European style
either does not exist or if it does, then at best in a
rudimentary form. In addition to this is the fact that
firms are often not particularly active as regards
trade unions and trade associations, and works
councils are rarely important (with the exception of
Hungary). There are therefore indications that la-
bour relations in the new Member states are head-
ing in the direction of the Anglo-Saxon model and
away from the continental European model. This al-
lows the new Member states to be able to take into
account the specific needs of firms in the difficult
catching-up process. Irrespective of this, in many of
these countries the state also continues to influence
labour relations. The state still acts firstly as an im-
portant employer, and secondly as a key partner in
the context of national social and employment pacts.
What is also worth mentioning are the minimum wa-
ges that are in force in most of the new Member
states, which are between 28% and 43% of the av-
erage gross pay (Funk/Lesch 2004).
The functionality of labour relations will be of great
importance in the catching-up process of the new
Member states. Associations and representations of
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interests have still to be set up. In so doing they have
still to prove their usefulness. This will also include
preparing their members and also the public for a
long adjustment process. An extension of national
or regional employment pacts, also including the
government, would benefit the development of the
labour market and contribute to the development of
a productive social dialogue.
3.2.2 Wages and income inequalities
In 2002 the labour costs per hour worked in the
manufacturing industry of the Central and Eastern
European EU states were only a fraction of the cor-
responding costs in the western neighbouring coun-
tries (cf. Table 8). The labour cost differentials re-
flect by and large the differences in the level of eco-
nomic development and in productivity, so that the
level of unit labour costs of the new Member states
and those of the old members of the EU15 differ
far less considerably than the absolute labour costs.
Irrespective of this, the existing considerable differ-
entials will keep wage pressure high for a long time
in the enlarged European Union, will encourage the
relocation of labour-intensive productions from the
west to the east and will intensify the competition of
otherwise non-tradable or hardly tradable services
immediately along the new borders in the EU.
In addition to the considerable income disparities
between the new Member states and the previousThe European Social Model and eastern enlargement Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei
EU15, ten years after the and of Communism the
income inequalities in the countries are more pro-
nounced on average than they are in Western Eu-
rope. A comparison of the Gini coefficients for the
distribution of income shows that the inequalities
have grown clearly in all of the new Member states
(cf. Table 9). The income disparities correlate with
low union density, small shares of firms bound by
collective agreements and little centralisation and
co-ordination of wage bargaining (cf. OECD 2004).
The question as to whether the greater income ine-
quality will only be a temporary phenomenon in the
course of the catching-up process remains open, for
a reduction of the disparities is conceivable if the
positive development continues (cf. EEAG 2004).
One way to counteract the income disparities in the
primary distribution is by state redistribution. How-
ever, because of their development backlog the po-
tential of the Central and Eastern European econo-
mies for substantial social-policy intervention is ex-
ceptionally limited.
3.2.3 Social protection and labour market
policy
For financing their social security systems, the new
Member states in Central and Eastern Europe tend
to lean more heavily on social security contributions
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than the average of the EU-15.5 This represents a
heavy burden for the difficult labour market situa-
tion in these countries. For high non-wage labour
costs slow down employment, especially at the lower
end of the wage scale, thus strengthening the persist-
ence of unemployment. Whether or not social secu-
rity contributions can be lowered depends on what
alternative financing possibilities there are via direct
or indirect taxes, or whether more benefits can be
left to private provision. In view of the economic
development backlog of the new Member states nei-
ther of the options are easy to realise, however, as
they both lead first to a shifting of the burden.
The problems involved in arranging the systems of
social protection in the new Member states show
clear parallels to the countries of Western Europe.
What is of outstanding importance in this respect
is the pressure on the pension scheme, due to the
demographic development, and the pressure on the
unemployment insurance, due to the employment
problems.6
In the Central and Eastern European countries pen-
sion schemes are in a phase of radical change. In-
come-related pensions from contributory systems Ð
some in connection with means-tested minimum
pensions such as in Latvia and Slovakia Ð formed
the basis for the pension system in the new Member
states during the transition to a market economy (cf.
Pimpertz 2004). Like in western countries of the
EU15 with predominantly contributory pension
schemes, in the course of the transformation there
were reforms with three key elements (cf. Fultz
2003):
 Firstly the benefit parameters of the contributory
systems were changed. Thus almost all the coun-
tries raised the retirement age and reduced the
value of years of coverage for the future pension
entitlement.
 Secondly four of the ten new Member states
(Hungary in 1998, Poland in 1999, Latvia in 2001
and Estonia in 2002) supplemented their contribu-
tory systems with funded elements. This consti-
5 According to OECD figures, in 2001 these social security contri-
butions as a percentage of the gross domestic product were 17.4
percent in the Czech Republic, 14.7 percent in Slovakia, 11.5 per-
cent in Hungary and 10.0 percent in Poland. In 2001 the EU15
average was 11.7 percent, with the highest value of 15.9 percent
in Sweden and the lowest value of 2.2 percent in Denmark.
6 Health insurance is not intended as a detailed subject in this
paper. It should only be pointed out here that with regard to
health insurance, social protection systems funded largely from
employer and employee contributions exist in the meantime in
the central and eastern European countries.Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei The European Social Model and eastern enlargement
tuted a particular burden for countries with still
poorly developed economies because considera-
ble transition costs are incurred. Firstly funds cur-
rently have to flow into setting up capital in fa-
vour of the current working generation, secondly
at the same time funds have to be found from the
social security systems for benefits in favour of the
older generation.
 Thirdly, in almost all of the new countries incen-
tives in favour of a voluntary pension insurance
were put in place. Here tax relief on private sav-
ings and on the setting up of company pension
schemes was prominent.
The emerging problems for the pension systems in
the new Member states are obvious, as they are in
western Europe. The risks of their longer-term fi-
nancing are prominent. Life expectancy, which un-
like in western countries is currently stagnating in
the new Member states (with the exception of Slo-
venia), will presumably increase again soon and, in
combination with a shrinking population (as a result
of declining birth rates), will generate large financial
burdens for the active part of the population. How-
ever, funded methods alone are not a solution to the
problems of ageing and a shrinking population,
since the active generation ultimately always has to
bear the costs of the passive generation, whether di-
rectly in the contributory system, or indirectly in the
funded system, the method of saving for one’s future
pension. The introduction of funded methods and
the support of voluntary forms of old-age pension
schemes are, however, a way to relieve the burden
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of non-wage labour costs, or at least to stop the in-
crease.
With regard to the type of unemployment benefits,
most of the new Member states have already
adapted to the EU15 to a large extent. Thus there
are already earnings-replacement benefits in the
form of unemployment benefit and diverse reinte-
gration measures everywhere. The main difference
from western Europe, however, is the degree of cov-
erage, i.e. as a rule fewer risks for fewer people are
covered at a lower level and for a shorter period of
time. Measured as a proportion of the gross domes-
tic product, expenditure on labour market policy
(earnings-replacement benefits plus measures)
amounted to a total of 0.30 to 1.25 percent maxi-
mum in the new Member states, which is only just
half of the (unweighted) average of the EU14 ex-
cluding Luxembourg (cf. Table 10).
Especially when they are paid for long periods, high
earnings-replacement benefits can function as a res-
ervation wage, thus reducing the incentive to work
and contributing to the persistence of unemploy-
ment. There can be no question of “generous” trans-
fer payments in the new Member states, however
(cf. Social Security Administration 2002). These
states have contributory unemployment benefit sys-
tems, with the exception of Estonia, in which the
duration of unemployment benefit is generally com-
paratively short, e.g. 180 days in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Estonia and Lithuania, and 270 days in
Hungary and Latvia. Longer durations of benefit
are possible in exceptions, if contributions were paidThe European Social Model and eastern enlargement Friedrich Buttler, Ulrich Schoof and Ulrich Walwei
for a longer period (Latvia, Slovenia), if unemploy-
ment is high in certain regions (Poland) or if older
workers are affected by unemployment (Slovenia).
The wage replacement rates are not generous, ei-
ther, and amount to between 50 percent and 65 per-
cent of the previous net wage at the start of benefit
entitlement.
Analogous to the low level of expenditure on pas-
sive benefits, expenditure on employment and train-
ing schemes is also comparatively low in the Central
and Eastern European countries. In 2002 the per-
centages determined for the Central and Eastern
European EU states ranged between 0.08 percent
and 0.52 percent. These percentages were clearly be-
low the unweighted average of the EU14, which was
1.01 percent of the gross domestic product. The
main emphasis of these measures is on wage sub-
sidies, measures aimed at particular target groups
and in some cases also job-creation measures. In
view of the far-reaching structural changes and the
emerging need for mobility between firms, regions
and fields of work, especially the limited expendi-
ture on further training needs to be questioned.
3.2.4 Prospects for the social order
In the course of the transformation to a market
economy, institutional structures have developed in
the new Member states, which show similarities to
the OECD countries and the EU15. The affinity can
be seen in the systems of labour relations, in social
protection and in the way that labour market regula-
tions are arranged. There are considerable differen-
ces, however, with regard to the level of social bene-
fits.
In the process of globalisation and the integration
of economic areas (such as in Europe), welfare-state
measures are also subject to competition as decisive
location factors. Costs and benefits of social-policy
intervention and its functionality thus help to decide
whether an economy can develop dynamically. It
must be taken into account here, however, that
there are interdependences between economic
growth and welfare-state intervention. On the one
hand growth policy is the best social policy because
social risks can be avoided in this way and a stable
financing of social systems is possible. On the other
had the welfare state can also encourage economic
dynamics because planning certainty arises as a re-
sult of social protection: the individual can take on
economic risks without immediately jeopardising his
existence. The consequence of this is the precedence
of business development accompanied by a welfare
state aiming at activation, which focuses on the life-
long employability of the labour force.
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Welfare-state measures do not necessarily have to
be subject to competition in integrated economic ar-
eas such as the EU, however. They could be entirely
or partly withdrawn from competition by means of
binding, supranational standards. There are, how-
ever, practical and especially economic reasons for
not harmonising social policy supranationally. One
practical argument is that social systems have quite
different historical backgrounds and harmonisation
would not be easy to implement. What is of eco-
nomic importance is the fact that possible transac-
tion costs from a heterogeneous system are more
than offset in the longer term by the dynamics re-
sulting from independent economic areas competing
with many of their basic economic conditions. Social
models are therefore the result of national search
processes, experiments and political decisions. If
barriers to trade are removed, then the most effi-
cient solution becomes visible and can be adopted
by other countries. Furthermore, this provides in-
centives to seek and pursue new methods of social
protection.
Another equally serious economic argument against
harmonising social systems is that nation states dem-
onstrate different levels of development. As they
had economic starting levels that are not compara-
ble and also therefore do not grow at the same
speed, they can be affected by economic shocks to
very different extents. If less well-developed coun-
tries such as the new EU Member states are not to
be overtaxed, minimum standards could be orien-
tated towards the possibilities and limits of these
weaker countries. This need not be a problem for
more developed countries, however, because they
are in competition with their entire basic economic
conditions. But in the case of the countries that are
not yet so well developed a catching-up process
should and can get under way in the social field, too,
as a result of economic growth.
4 Effects of eastern enlargement on
the European Social Modell: who
is changing whom?
4.1 Stress factors and governance prob-
lems not associated with enlarge-
ment
In order to prevent developments of the ESM that
are not caused by enlargement being erroneously
put down to enlargement it is necessary to analyse
stress factors which the ESM is exposed to by inter-
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such as for instance the changes in international lo-
cation conditions in the context of advancing global-
isation, can of course by accentuated by the enlarge-
ment. However, not only globalisation, but also
other influences that can in turn be intensified in the
process of globalisation play a role: “Many studies
consider other causes as more probable, such as de-
industrialization, rising unemployment, an aging
population, changing family structures, and, most
important, institutional legacies and political priori-
ties” (Dauderstädt 2003, S. 6). We emphasise in par-
ticular three of these influences as stress factors:
changing production systems, the ageing of the pop-
ulation and a high level of structural unemployment.
(1) Changes in international production systems find
expression in intensified transnational competi-
tion of location. Capital mobility and market in-
tegration make it possible to change location in
order to take advantage of comparative cost ad-
vantages. Where low labour costs and good qual-
ification levels can be found at the same time
elsewhere, employment also comes under pres-
sure in locations with high productivity in this
process. Low standards of social protection and
low levels of corporate taxation are used world-
wide as instruments of competition of location in
the race to the bottom. Inclusive strategies in the
context of the ESM on the other hand back the
public provision and quality of the workforce-
related, material and institutional infrastructure
in the Member states in order to allow these
countries to stride ahead along the path of high
productivity. Strategies of tax avoidance con-
cerning mobile capital and other fiscal challen-
ges which are caused among other things by the
ageing of the population and the costs of unem-
ployment impose limits on this, though.
(2) The ageing of the population, in so far as it is
caused by growing life expectancy, is one of the
indisputable achievements of humanity. In so far
as it is due to a lack of young people this does
not apply. Such unbalanced ageing hampers the
development of productivity and puts the social
protection systems under stress: fewer contribu-
tors, more benefit recipients. Furthermore, in
view of high unemployment in a number of
countries in the past years, early retirement mod-
els Ð also with the support of labour market pol-
icy Ð have helped to lower drastically the age at
which one is considered “too old” on the labour
market. Today the long-term structural conse-
quences of this strategy to reduce the supply of
labour are clear.
Young people have not been able to gain any
recognisable advantage from the reduction of
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the labour supply of older people; jobs becoming
vacant as a result of early retirement were
dropped to a large extent in business adjustment
processes. In many Member states, youth unem-
ployment and the transition of young adults
from training into occupation, which has become
more difficult, are problems today more than
ever before.
Internationally comparative studies on the other
hand do not reveal that there is a positive con-
nection between low labour force participation
and low unemployment; on the contrary the ex-
ample of Scandinavia shows a positive connec-
tion between high labour force participation and
comparatively low unemployment. A strategy
that used to be promising at least in the short
term, the redistribution of dwindling employ-
ment opportunities by means of reductions in
working hours, has reached a medium- and long-
term impasse. The Lisbon Strategy is conse-
quently aimed at a higher labour force participa-
tion of women, young adults and older workers
in all the Member states, admittedly without hav-
ing reached a breakthrough with weak growth
and low employment intensity of growth in sev-
eral Member states.
In the 1990s the pension reform debate was in-
fluenced in both the east and the west by the
strategy represented in the World Bank study
(Averting the Old Age Crisis, 1994) of privatis-
ing the old-age pension systems. Currently both
here and in the east it is more a matter of options
for the combination of public and private forms
and a closer individual linking of contributions
paid and pension income. What emerges is hy-
brid forms rather than pure types (Rein und
Schmähl, 2004). The positions have converged:
on the one hand the opinion has grown that
funded pensions with defined contributions, but
with payments dependent on market conditions
require supplementation by the pay-as-you-go
pillar; on the other hand the closer individual
linking of contributions and pension income
changes the incentive structures.
(3) High, and in view of large proportions of long-
term unemployed, persistent unemployment is
not only a challenge for economic and social pol-
icy in the context of the ESM, but because of its
costs to the economy as a whole, it has itself be-
come a stress factor which clearly limits several
countries’ possibilities of action for making all
efforts to reach the ambitious competition target
of the Lisbon Strategy, e.g. in innovation policy
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ogy. The Member states respond differently to
the challenge of unemployment. They either use
earnings-replacement benefits from the unem-
ployment insurance combined with measures of
active labour market policy, or specific benefits
for particularly low-income groups of the popu-
lation, so-called in-work benefits. In any case,
however, they have to pay considerable amounts
to stem labour-market-related poverty, which
can result in crowding-out effects. Crowding out
occurs on the financing side via the tax burden
or non-wage labour costs and on the administra-
tion side via the binding of processing capacities,
which would otherwise be available to the em-
ployment service for improving labour market -
allocation.
Earnings-replacement benefits and active labour
market policy are frequently accused from a labour-
economics viewpoint of causing disincentive effects
on the willingness to take up employment (cf. z.B.
Nickell, S. and Lazear, R. 1999 and Calmfors, L.
2004). Adverse incentives can lead to publicly
funded benefits accentuating still further the struc-
tural persistence of unemployment.
The criticism of crowding-out effects and incentive
effects has led in a number of Member states to la-
bour-market-policy and social-policy measures
aimed at lowering non-wage labour costs and boost-
ing incentives to take up work. The Schröder/Blair
paper presented in 1999 “Europe: The Third Way/
Die Neue Mitte” says: “Work was burdened with
ever higher costs. The means of achieving social jus-
tice became identified with ever higher levels of
public spending regardless of what they achieved or
the impact of the taxes required to fund it on com-
petitiveness, employment and living standards”. Re-
orientations are therefore concerned with focussing
on particular target groups, binding the payment of
benefits to means testing, changes in the rules re-
garding the suitability of jobs, and reducing the level
and duration of benefit payments in the case of
long-term unemployment. With the aim of reducing
non-wage labour costs, both structural reforms and
benefit cuts in the protection against unemployment
and the funding of the health service as well as a
shift in funding towards general taxes are taken into
consideration. If changing the financial basis leads
to a net additional tax burden, then the crowding-
out problem continues to exist, though possibly with
different effective distribution effects.
Improved incentive structures are also the subject
of proposals to combine the labour market flexibil-
ity that is required for dynamics and adaptability
with the equally necessary stability and social secu-
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rity in such a way that people are prepared to take
on risks while trusting in the possibility to shape the
future and in the contracting parties. Generally the
workers are credited with interest in stability and
the firms with interest in flexibility, in fact both par-
ties need both factors and that does not only apply
on labour markets. Basically it concerns optimum
allocation of risk, in the present context also taking
into account competitiveness and social inclusion. If
the burden of this allocation falls mainly on the
firms, then this has consequences on their invest-
ment and employment strategies; if the burden falls
mainly on the workers, this has consequences on the
workers’ identification with the firm, on their will-
ingness to participate in further training and on
their productivity. “Flexicurity” concepts (Auer and
Cazes 2003) intend to take this into account for ex-
ample by combining low levels of statutory dismissal
protection with adequate social protection in the
case of unemployment and improved assistance to-
wards taking up employment, or by also providing
reasonable social protection in non-standard em-
ployment relationships (cf. Kok Report 2003, p. 30ff.
and ILO 2005).
Whereas the instruments that apply to the avoid-
ance of crowding out and to incentive compatibility
focus as a matter of priority on the supply side of
the labour market, Keynesian-style macroeconomic
demand policy has received no credit from the ma-
jority for 25 years. With the introduction of the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union and the Stability and
Growth Pact, the countries involved have bound
their hands to a certain extent in macroeconomic
terms. What is behind this is the empirically well-
proven experience of the necessity of stable basic
conditions for producers and consumers. Of course
stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policy alone
are not sufficient guarantors for a successful em-
ployment policy, as can be seen from the macroeco-
nomic employment results after decades of concen-
tration on stability policy and improving the supply
conditions. It is necessary to raise employment and
its quality to a priority policy objective again instead
of expecting it to occur simply as a result of good
labour market policy and stability-oriented macro-
policy. For this it is not enough to give labour mar-
ket policy top priority. Yet, the employment effects
of labour market policy are frequently overrated by
its advocates. Mutatis mutandis the same applies for
many high expectations that its critics associate with
changes in legislation. Necessary structural reforms
have to be accompanied by measures to stabilise
confidence and demand. The required funding can
only be raised in the context of budgetary policy
that is conscious of stability. Restructuring the
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the economic structure is suitable for boosting confi-
dence in future competitiveness.
With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the system
competition between east and west, between social-
ism and capitalism as they exist in reality came to an
end. Since then internationally comparative political
science research has concentrated on variants of
capitalism and welfare states (cf. Esping-Andersen
1990 and 1998, Hall and Soscice 2001, Hicks and
Kenworthy 2003). In 1990 Esping-Andersen distin-
guished three “worlds” of welfare capitalism, a “lib-
eral” one, a “conservative and strongly corporatist”
one and a “social democratic” one. Hicks and Ken-
worthy compare two typical variants, a “progres-
sively liberal” one and a “traditionally conservative”
one; and in the spectrum of progressively liberal var-
iants they identify two wings, a “liberal” one and a
“social democratic” one. If one follows their termi-
nology, then it is possible to show converging cur-
rent trends in the latter spectrum: on the one hand
social-democratic positions are taking up to a con-
siderable extent arguments of the liberal economic
critique with the aim of improving employment per-
formance, on the other hand progressive liberalism
is thinking more than before about social inequality.
“Progressive liberalism seems to progressively redis-
tribute income and reduce poverty. It is also associ-
ated with greater gender equality in the labour mar-
ket....The principle consequence of traditional con-
servativism appears to be weakened employment
performance. Much of the recent critique of the wel-
fare state has centred on its purported job-reducing
effects” (Hicks and Kenworthy, p. 53).
The reform initiatives in the context of labour mar-
ket and social policy in the old Member states, which
are described as examples of response to stress fac-
tors, are part of this current trend and not the result
of eastern enlargement. Admittedly, they could be
accentuated by enlargement in one direction or an-
other. The first answer given in this section to the
question as to who is changing whom, is as follows:
the old Member states are changing their positions
themselves in the context of the ESM under the in-
fluence of the stress factors according to policy-mak-
ing decisions.
4.2 Distinctly liberal reforms in the new
member states?
The reform programmes for the transformation
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which
were drawn up by the international monetary insti-
tutions in the early 1990s, were orientated towards
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the Washington Consensus, according to which ma-
croeconomic stability can be achieved most simply
and most rapidly by means of speedy liberalisation
and privatisation combined with restrictive mone-
tary and fiscal policy. At the same time public ex-
penditure should be reduced in order to prevent pri-
vate initiatives being displaced. Privatisation was ac-
companied by elements of social protection that
were previously provided by companies being
shifted onto the state or the market. Vaughan-
Whitehead (2003, p. 34) aptly describes the combi-
nation of external and internal influences: “The ad-
visory work of international monetary institutions,
combined with the emergence of a new generation
of political leaders with a strong willingness to do
whatever possible to promote real capitalist econo-
mies, has already had a major impact”.
After the years of socialism economic liberalisation
has also been rightly welcomed as the political liber-
ation from long-endured constraint. This contrib-
uted towards the acceptance of proposals made by
the international monetary institutions at least at the
outset of transformation. Old state-run or previ-
ously state-related institutions such as trade unions
were disavowed, others such as federations of busi-
ness enterprises were unknown. New tasks of social
protection or the adaptation to international and
European standards were not achievable by the tra-
ditional system of institutions and norms. Amongst
the Eastern European and Baltic Member states,
with all the differences in the development level of
the social protection systems and in the structures
of national, sectoral, regional and company social
dialogue, there is therefore nothing to which the
term “conservative corporatist” in Esping-Ander-
sen’s terminology could apply. There is still a consid-
erable unmet need for institutional infrastructure,
without the meeting of these needs being likely to
lead to a corporatist result in the foreseeable future.
That is why this variant of capitalism can not be re-
garded as a likely future prospect for the new mem-
ber states. In view of the more decentralised wage
bargaining systems, Funk and Lesch (2004) conclude
in addition that “labour relations in Central and
Eastern Europe can be placed closer to the Anglo-
Saxon model than to the continental European
one”.
Our analysis of the economic catching-up process
and the changes in welfare-state institutions (cf. es-
pecially 3.2.) does not fail to recognise the influence
of definitely liberal policy-making decisions, but also
draws attention to other influences:
(1) As explained above, the decline in employment
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of social protection against the risks of old age
and unemployment under pressure both from
the payment side and the financing side. Facts
that are of relevance for stability policy, such as
inflation and national debt, set short- and me-
dium-term limits; in the longer term it is neces-
sary to secure the sustainability of the financing.
The decision made by the governments of the
transformation countries to cover fewer risks for
fewer people at a lower level was therefore at
best partly the expression of market-liberal defi-
nitions of position. Challenges, which are similar
in structure to those in the older Member states
were prominent and the new Member states of
course have to face these challenges at their re-
spective lower levels of production and produc-
tivity.
(2) As explained in the third section, the new Mem-
ber states have set up labour market institutions
which are in principle similar to those of the
EU15, such as employment protection, whose
degree of strictness or liberality differs little
from the mean of the EU15, or which are com-
parable with the EU15 in their spectrum of ben-
efits, such as active and passive labour market
policy, albeit with a far lower expenditure level.
With high levels of unemployment caused by
transformation, high non-wage labour costs have
not been sufficient to finance further benefits,
even in comparison with the EU15. Benefit cuts
have been accepted in order to reduce non-wage
labour costs.
(3) For the prospects of economic and social policy
in the new Member states it is not decisive that
they can only finance an accordingly small social
budget with their current level of production and
productivity and that many social-policy institu-
tions have not yet reached any comparable ca-
pacity to work in the catching-up process. What
is more decisive is how forward-looking policy
relates economic efficiency with the social di-
mension. Is the conviction gaining acceptance
that the social dimension can be used as a pro-
ductive factor for investment, growth and em-
ployment and has a positive effect on long-term
economic development and political stability or
is the relationship defined as a “first” and “later”
process, growth first, social cohesion later?
(4) With regard to the relationship between the mar-
ket and the state there are differences of inter-
ests, as there are in the old Member states. The
trade-off between efficiency and cohesion im-
plied in the “first”/“later” paradigm is assessed
differently depending on the political conviction
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and expected participation. In addition to this, in
the new member states the attitude of large parts
of the population towards the market and the
state is also quite ambivalent because of the
transformation experience. The positive assess-
ment of the political and economic freedom in
the open society and economy, which was gained
by overcoming the old system, stands opposite
the need for an effective state that takes on the
part of provision for existence that the individual
does not feel able to do alone. The experiences
made during the transformation crisis and the
considerable income inequality, which may not
only be a temporary phenomenon, support this
need. In order for the productivity of the social
dimension to be proved cognitively and with po-
litical conviction on the other hand, reform pol-
icy has to be fundable with a view to sustainabil-
ity, i.e. it must avoid crowding out, while at the
same time being arranged in such a way as to be
incentive-compatible and promote social cohe-
sion. These are once again the same challenges
made of the reform agendas, of “good govern-
ance” instead of “deregulation” in the old and
the new member states.
The second answer to the question as to who is
changing whom, given in this section, is therefore:
starting out from different historical experiences of
the past decades and different levels of production
and productivity, the old and the new Member states
have to withstand structurally similar challenges if
they want to achieve economic efficiency and social
cohesion simultaneously. Coming from an egalitar-
ian tradition, in the 1990s the new member states
mainly experienced an income inequality exceeding
the average of the old member states. The vast ma-
jority of the populations will call for social cohesion.
Together with the integration advantages of enlarge-
ment, including assistance from the European Struc-
tural Funds from which the new Member states ben-
efit with priority, the catching-up process, which be-
gan in the new Member states from the mid-1990s
onwards, provides increasingly good conditions for
the further strengthening of social cohesion. Of
course other policy options and development sce-
narios with less social cohesion are also conceivable.
Which of them will become established also depends
on Community policy and the support of its objec-
tives by the national players.
4.3 The European agenda after enlarge-
ment
Enlargement coincided with the realisation that the
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the speed with which reforms are being imple-
mented that can be observed in the old member
states. In the report of the High-Level Group of In-
dependent Experts of the European Commission
chaired by Wim Kok, “Facing the Challenge” of No-
vember 2004, reasons given for the disappointing
implementation balance include the overloaded
agenda, a lack of co-ordination of competing priori-
ties and above all a lack of determined political ac-
tion. The open method of co-ordination has not
been pursued rigorously enough.
As a result the European Commission proposed fo-
cusing efforts on two key tasks in order to bring new
life into the Lisbon Strategy: “Bringing about a
stronger and sustainable growth and creating more
and better jobs” (Delivering on Growth and Jobs,
Communication to the Spring European Council,
February 2005). The renewed action plan names
new measures at European and national level for
raising the attractiveness to investors and workers,
for promoting knowledge and innovation for growth
and for creating more and better jobs. The priority
takes up the focus of the first Kok-report: “Jobs,
jobs, jobs”. The criticism of the previous practice of
the open method of co-ordination leads to demands
to streamline the procedures and make them more
binding and to set out clear responsibilities.
At the same time the European Commission pre-
sented its Communication on the Social Agenda. In
this two main priorities are given: “moving towards
full employment: making work a real option for all,
increasing the quality and productivity of work, and
anticipating and managing change” and “a more co-
hesive society: equal opportunities for all”. The ex-
planation speaks of an integrated approach “guaran-
teeing a positive interplay between economic, social
and employment policies” and it is proposed “to
modernise systems of social protection by adapting
them to the current requirements of our societies,
on the basis of solidarity and by strengthening their
role as a productive factor”. In brief: jobs, jobs, jobs
and social policy as a productive factor. In his pres-
entation before the Governing Body of the ILO in
March 2005, the Commissioner for Employment
and Social Affairs, Vladimir Spidla, made his posi-
tion clear as to how the commission sees the balance
between the two: “There is no first and later”.
If the answers given so far to the question “who is
changing whom?” are summarised and put into the
context of the most recent documents presented
here, then one can conclude from this the clear in-
tention to put the European Social Model into prac-
tice in its characteristic elements (cf. 2.1.) in the en-
larged Europe. For this the market processes in the
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new member states will intensify the trends towards
self-transformation in the old member states and the
catching-up processes will increasingly enable the
new member states to use social inclusion and pro-
ductivity development for mutual reinforcement.
Policy-making decisions both here and there will
also be decisive for determining the position within
the range of the ESM.
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